Subsets thereof containing the chosen, or preferable, alternatives at the original set. In our characterization, hyperplans are going to be functions from sets of sets of worlds to The possible worlds contained in it, but rather the possible alternatives that are salient at that However, that distinction is still too coarse to capture the scalarity of evaluatives. important, see Portner and Rubinstein 2016). State (or of any set of possible worlds) that the hyperplan will “see”, so to speak, are not simplyġ4 A different Kratzerian strategy would be to turn to the distinction between strong and weak necessity modals (Fintel and Iatridou 2005 Von Fintel and Iatridou 2008), which has been applied to the contrast between extreme and non-extreme deontic adjectives (crucial vs. Secondly, the way that we are going to characterize hyperplans, the property of an epistemic Information in the same way that deontics do. Necessary to account for deontic modals, but it is not clear that evaluatives rely on epistemic The assumption that the arguments of hyperplans are information states. That effect, we propose to change the Gibbard-Yalcin semantics in two ways. This is what we are going to do in this section. Represent a scale of value using hyperplans. If one wants to understand value in terms of properties of hyperplans, we need to be able to The shortcomings of Gibbard-Yalcin semantics are clear, but they can be overcome.

Hyperplan def